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Abstract 
The international goal for rich countries to devote 0.7% of their national income to 
development assistance has become a cause célèbre for aid activists and has been 
accepted in many official quarters as the legitimate target for aid budgets. The origins of 
the target, however, raise serious questions about its relevance. First, the 0.7% target was 
calculated using a series of assumptions that are no longer true, and justified by a model 
that is no longer considered credible. When we use essentially the same method used to 
arrive at 0.7% in the early 1960s and apply today’s conditions, it yields an aid goal of just 
0.01% of rich-country GDP for the poorest countries and negative aid flows to the 
developing world as a whole. We do not claim in any way that this is the ‘right’ amount 
of aid, but only that this exercise lays bare the folly of the initial method and the 
subsequent unreflective commitment to the 0.7% aid goal. Second, we document the fact 
that, despite frequent misinterpretation of UN documents, no government ever agreed in a 
UN forum to actually reach 0.7%—though many pledged to move toward it. Third, we 
argue that aid as a fraction of rich country income does not constitute a meaningful 
metric for the adequacy of aid flows. It would be far better to estimate aid needs by 
starting on the recipient side with a meaningful model of how aid affects development. 
Although aid certainly has positive impacts in many circumstances, our quantitative 
understanding of this relationship is too poor to accurately conduct such a tally. The 0.7% 
target began life as a lobbying tool, and stretching it to become a functional target for real 
aid budgets across all donors is to exalt it beyond reason. That no longer makes any 
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Introduction 
 
The international goal for rich countries to devote 0.7% of their national income to 
development assistance has become a cause célèbre for aid activists and, lately, 
politicians. However ubiquitous and durable, the target of 0.7% was never meant to 
represent the ‘right’ level of aid needed by poor countries. A look at its history shows that 
it was calculated using methods with little relevance to today’s understanding of the 
development process, and actually reaching 0.7% of income in aid was never agreed to 
by any government or international body prior to 2005. Originally intended as a political 
tool to goad rich countries to modestly increase their aid budgets, the specific figure of 
0.7% was a compromise between educated guesses based on economic conditions in the 
early 1960s and on a crude and deeply flawed model of growth. Despite these origins, 
“0.7%” has taken on a life of its own and become a powerful rallying cry for aid 
proponents. Indeed, in 2005, advocates are demanding that rich countries reach this 
specific target (and with some success). But there has been little reflection on whether 
0.7% is the right figure, where it comes from, and exactly what the international 
agreements pertaining to the goal say and do not say. 
 
Here we find that over time 0.7% has gained prominence well beyond its initial intention 
and gained credibility as the correct aid goal that it does not deserve. The next section 
outlines its origins, showing how the target emerged from a confluence of political and 
academic trends, and then eventually evolved into a political standard.  In the third 
section we ask whether it is still applicable and raise three questions about its continued 
relevance. We find that if we apply the same assumptions that went into the original 
formulation to conditions present today, that the updated target would be 0.01% of rich 
country income—well below current aid levels for all major donors. Next, we raise 
questions about the ‘financing gap’ model used to determine aid targets, showing that it 
has no theoretical or empirical basis. Finally, we argue that it is backwards to gauge aid 
levels based on the size of donors instead of the conditions in recipient economies. We do 
not argue that aid should in fact be greater or lesser, but rather seek to expose the shaky 
foundations of the 0.7% target and to question whether this is the right standard by which 




The 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) target has a long history that dates back more 
than half a century.
2 As explained below, the eventual target was mostly arbitrary, based 
on a series of assumptions that no longer are true, and justified by a model that is no 
longer considered credible. Despite its origins, acceptance of the 0.7% target increased 
and the figure has become a political mantra. As global economic conditions changed 
radically over the second half of the 20




The World Council of Churches is a Geneva-based organization that has promoted 
cooperation between different Christian sects since 1948, and claims to represent 400 
million people in 100 countries. From its inception the Council was a conduit for cash 
 
2 Many of the early ratios use GNP (equivalent to GNI) as the denominator, giving way to GDP in later 
years. We use them interchangeably. In 2003, GNI and GDP in the high-income OECD differed by 0.2%.  
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donations from parishes in rich countries to those in poor countries. At its 1955 Central 
Committee meeting in Davos, the Council asked Dutch agricultural economist Egbert de 
Vries, a senior World Bank official and devout Christian, to advise it on its aid efforts. 
De Vries made the case that no amount of church donations could reasonably do the job 
and that “a great amount of capital would be needed from the rich nations in order to 
achieve only a modest increase in the standard of living of the poorer.”
3
 
In 1955, total public and private capital flows to poor countries were about 0.5 percent of 
rich countries’ GNI.
4 The Council’s Central Committee, meeting in Denmark in 1958, 
adopted a statement that “[o]nly with substantial outside aid from the economically more 
developed countries … can countries with soundly based development plans hope to 
carry them through and avert the human disasters that follow from their failure. … Far 
more grants and generous loans are essential. … If at least one per cent of the national 
income of countries were devoted to these purposes, the picture would become much 
more hopeful.”
5 Though the Council provided no record of how it arrived at the one 
percent figure, it is unlikely that it was settled on for any other reason than that it was a 
round number representing roughly a doubling of capital flows from the levels of the 
mid-1950s. The Council’s request was transmitted to several developed countries’ 
missions to the United Nations. 
 
Throughout the late 1950s public and private capital flows all developing countries 
increased, and by 1960 had reached 0.83% of rich countries’ GNI.
6 In that year, the 
United Nations General Assembly called that level “inadequate” and adopted without 
vote the resolution that it “[e]xpresses the hope that the flow of international assistance 
and capital should be increased substantially so as to reach as soon as possible 




The 1% figure got more than just this hopeful nod from the UN. It was supported directly 
and explicitly—though not publicly—by rich-country governments. US State Department 
internal memos from early 1961 reveal that the Undersecretary of State for Economic and 
Agricultural Affairs “thought the Germans might agree to one per cent of gross national 
 
3 Darrill Hudson (1977), The World Council of Churches in International Affairs (Leighton Buzzard, UK: 
Faith Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), p. 172. 
4 The UN reported that total private and public capital flows from developed countries to developing 
countries averaged 2.6 billion per year 1951-1955, and 4.7 billion per year 1956-1959 (Proceedings of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 23 March–16 June 1964, Volume V, 
Financing and Invisibles: Institutional Arrangements, Table 1-1, p. 6). We thus assume that the total was 
around 3.5 billion in 1955. Real GDP growth in the high-income OECD countries averaged 4.5% between 
1955 and 1959 (Angus Maddison [2003], International Historical Statistics [Paris: OECD]), and inflation 
was roughly 2% per year (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt). The World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2005 
CD-ROM says that GNI of the high-income OECD in 1960 was $972 billion in current nominal dollars. 
Allowing for 4.5% real growth per year and 2% inflation, this means that high-income OECD GNI in 1955 
was about $710 billion. $3.5 billion/$710 billion is roughly 0.5%. 
5 World Council of Churches (1958), Minutes and Reports of the Eleventh Meeting of the Central 
Committee of the World Council of Churches: Nyborg Strand, Denmark, August 21-29, 1958 (Geneva: 
World Council of Churches), Appendix XIV, pp. 124-125. 
6 Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Second Session, New Delhi, 1 
February–29 March 1968, Volume IV, Problems and policies of financing, Table 8, p. 26. 
7 UN General Assembly resolution 1522, December 15, 1960. This was reaffirmed in identical language in 
GA resolution 1711, December 19, 1961.  
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production. This seemed satisfactory to Mr. [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk”, and that the 
State Department told all its European missions that “we can perhaps set as a collective 





It so happened that concurrent research by a group of very influential economists 
confirmed 1% of rich-country GNI as roughly the correct number. They included Paul 
Rosenstein-Rodan and Hollis Chenery, two of the first to hold the position now known as 
Chief Economist of the World Bank. Both carried out separate, sophisticated back-of-the-
envelope calculations of how much foreign capital would be needed by low-income 
countries in the early 1960s.
9 They based their estimates on theoretical work in the 1940s 
and 50s by Oxford’s Sir Roy Harrod and MIT’s Evsey Domar, drawing inspiration also 
from the work of W. W. Rostow, an MIT professor who became a top advisor to the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations. 
 
The work of Harrod and Domar
10 provided the first modern growth model and explored 
the consequences for employment and other economic variables of changes in the capital 
stock, assuming a simple and mechanistic link between capital and growth that was 
appropriate for their purposes. Rostow’s surveys of developed countries’ historical 
experience
11 concluded that a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of the “take-off 
into self-sustained growth” was “a rise in the rate of productive investment from (say) 5% 
or less to over 10% of national income.” Rosenstein-Rodan and Chenery separately took 
a mechanistic relationship between capital and growth in developing countries related to 
Harrod and Domar’s, and asked how much additional capital would be necessary to bring 
them to something like Rostow’s take-off point. 
 
Though their work was certainly more nuanced, at its core it estimated the capital 
requirement as the difference between domestic savings in poor countries and the amount 
of investment needed to achieve a certain amount of growth in Harrod and Domar’s 
 
8 Undersecretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs George Ball and Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk discussed a target of 1% of GDP. A White House memo from March 17, 1961 states that “Mr. Ball 
reviewed the problem of burden sharing and indicated that he thought the Germans might agree to one per 
cent of gross national production. This seemed satisfactory to Mr. Rusk.” Source: U.S. Department of State, 
FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. IX: Foreign Economic Policy, Office of the Historian, Document No. 97, 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus61-63ix/06_Section_6.html, accessed June 30, 2005. Later in the day 
on March 17, 1961, James C. Lobenstine of the US Dept. of State drafted a circular telegram that was 
transmitted to the US diplomatic missions in Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, Lisbon, London, Ottawa, Paris, 
Rome, Bern, Dublin, Madrid, Stockholm, Tokyo, and Vienna. It was approved by George Ball. It discusses 
preparations for the March 27-29 meeting of the OECD's Development Assistance Group (DAG), the first 
such meeting since the US joined the OECD. Section (c)(2) of the telegram says, “What is required is an 
increased, long-term, joint effort to help meet the needs of the developing countries. For this purpose, we 
can perhaps set as a collective target a sum of one per cent of our aggregate income.” Source: U.S. 
Department of State, FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. IX: Foreign Economic Policy, Office of the Historian, 
Document No. 98. http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus61-63ix/06_Section_6.html, accessed June 30, 
2005. 
9 P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan (1961), “International aid for undeveloped countries” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 43 (2): 107-138. Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout (1966), “Foreign assistance and economic 
development”, American Economic Review 56 (4): 679-733. 
10 Inter alia Evsey D. Domar (1946), “Capital expansion, rate of growth, and employment”, Econometrica 
14 (2): 137-147. 
11 W. W. Rostow (1956), “The take-off into self-sustained growth”, Economic Journal 66 (261): 25-48. W. 
W. Rostow (1959), “The stages of economic growth” Economic History Review 12 (1): 1-16.  
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model. To take a simplified example: If $4 of capital produce $1 of output per year, and 
5% annual growth in output is required, then 5% growth in capital is required as well. If 
output is $100 million, then investment that year must be 5% × $400 million = $20 
million. If national savings is only $15 million, then about $5 million in external capital 
is required. 
 
Using more sophisticated but essentially similar techniques, Rosenstein-Rodan arrived at 
an estimate of developing-country capital needs of $5.7 billion per year for the early 
1960s and rising over that decade. Chenery, using a model augmented to account not only 
for the gap between savings and investment but also the gap between exports and a 
postulated “minimum import level”, estimated a foreign capital requirement of $7.4 
billion in 1962 and $10–17 billion by 1970.
12 This was taken as necessary for a GNI 
growth rate of about 5% in the developing countries, precisely the growth goal set in the 
declaration of the first United Nations Development Decade in 1960.
13 UN documents of 
the time specifically cite these academic estimates of capital requirements.
14
 
The national incomes of the high-income OECD countries in 1961 totaled $1.03 trillion.
15 
In other words, the academic estimates of capital requirements in the developing world, 
on the order of $10 billion, happened to equal 1% of rich-country income. This number 
thus had both the endorsement of the General Assembly and the imprimatur of some of 
the top economists of the day, a combined political and academic pedigree that seems a 
mix of coincidence and coevolution. 
 
From 1% capital goal to 0.7% aid goal 
 
A final step remained for this “1%” goal for aggregate capital flows to become the 
modern “0.7%” goal for aid. The first meeting of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 noted that capital flows to developing 
countries had reached 0.8% of rich-country income in 1961, approximately three quarters 
of which were official bilateral aid.
16 The meeting thus hinted at, but did not adopt, an aid 
goal. The Conference’s final act stated that it “recommends” that “[e]ach economically 
advanced country should endeavor to supply … financial resources to the developing 
countries of a minimum net amount approaching as nearly as possible to 1 per cent of its 
national income …”
17 An aid goal was not only absent but notably and explicitly ruled 
out: “This is not intended to represent either a ceiling or a suitable method for comparing 




The second meeting of UNCTAD, in New Delhi in 1968, went one step further but 
stopped just short of a formal aid target. Background studies by the UNCTAD secretariat 
 
12 Chenery and Strout op. cit. p. 722. 
13 UN General Assembly resolution 1710 (XVI), December 19, 1961. 
14 E.g. Rosenstein-Rodan’s estimate is cited on p. 15, footnote 10, in the UNCTAD proceedings at Geneva 
1964, Vol. V, op. cit. 
15 GNI, current US dollars. World Bank (2005), World Development Indicators 2005, CD-ROM 
(Washington, DC: World Bank). 
16 UNCTAD proceedings at Geneva 1964, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 15. 
17 Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 23 March–16 June 
1964, Volume I, Final Act and Report, Annex A.IV.2, Section III.4, p. 44 
18 Ibid., Annex A.IV.2, Section III.5, p. 44.  
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noted that combined public and private capital flows had slipped from 0.87% of rich-
country GNI to 0.62% over 1961–1966.
19 These background studies—which were not 
endorsed by the delegates—suggested that to meet the General Assembly’s one percent 
goal for total capital flows, “it would be desirable to have a target for official 
development assistance as a measure of the commitment of governments to international 
development” and “consistent with the 1 per cent target, … [c]ountries whose net official 
assistance is currently below 0.75 per cent of their GNP might undertake to raise it to this 
level by, say, 1971.”
20 To arrive at this number, the study explicitly assumes that official 
flows would continue to represent roughly two thirds to three quarters of total capital 
flows through the mid 1970s.
21
 
Though the Conference reiterated support for the 1% goal of total capital flows, it did not 
adopt the secretariat’s suggestion of an aid goal. The Conference’s “decision” on an “aid 
volume target” reads: “A number of developed countries stated that within the 1 per cent 
target defined above, they were prepared to attempt to provide a minimum of 0.75 per 
cent of their GNP by way of net official financial resource transfers. One developed 
country expressed the view that this proportion should be at least half of the 1 per cent 
target. The other developed countries, even though they are not prepared to accept any 
precise ratio, believe that endeavors should be made to ensure that official bilateral and 
multilateral flows represent a substantial part of the totality of financial resources 
provided.”
22 The anonymity of these references suggests deep and sensitive divisions at 
the meeting. 
 
The aid community wanted more. World Bank President Robert McNamara together with 
British Minister of Overseas Development Lord Reginald Prentice conceived the 
Commission on International Development—more commonly known as the “Pearson 
Commission” after its chair, former Canadian prime minister and Nobel laureate Lester 
Pearson. The main purpose of the group was to use the commissioners’ political clout to 
draw attention to the UNCTAD target in legislatures, especially the United States.
23  
From its inception, the Pearson Commission was conceived in order to “rejuvenate the 
commitment to the UNCTAD target… The Commissioners were largely ‘political 
influentials’ and well-known economists to help persuade legislatures, with the US as a 




Arrival at the 0.7% figure was also the result of an arbitrary compromise based on what 
was thought politically feasible at the time. Former Pearson Commission staffer Sartaj 
Aziz recalls:  
 
19 UNCTAD proceedings at New Delhi 1968, Vol. IV, op. cit., “Growth and external development finance: 
study by the secretariat of UNCTAD”, TD/7/Supp.1, p. 13. 
20 Ibid., “Growth, development financing, and aid: issues and proposals. Study by the UNCTAD 
secretariat”, TD/7, pp. 3, 4. 
21 Ibid., paragraph 9, p. 2. 
22 Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Second Session, New Delhi, 
1 February–29 March 1968, Volume I, Report and Annexes, Agenda item 12, Section 27 (II), paragraph 7, 
p. 39. Dated March 28, 1968. 
23 The Commission members, in addition to Pearson, were Sir Edward Boyle (UK), Roberto de Oliviera 
Campos (Brazil), C. Douglas Dillon (US), Wilfried Guth (Germany), W. Arthur Lewis (Jamaica), Robert 
Marjolin (France), and Saburo Okita (Japan).  
24 Personal communication with the authors, July 2005. Stern later became Managing Director of the World 
Bank.  
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By the time the Pearson Commission met, there was a virtual consensus 
on the 1% target. From there, the rationale for reaching the 0.70% target 
for ODA was straightforward. ODA had already reached 0.54% in 1961. 
An increase to 0.6% would have been considered too modest since 
countries like France had reached 0.72% by 1968. I remember one staff 
discussion in which we debated whether the ODA target should be 0.70% 
or 0.75%. Consensus reached was in favor of 0.70%, as a ‘simple, 
attainable and adequate’ target.
25
 
The final report, delivered to McNamara in September 1969, read: “We therefore 
recommend that each aid-giver increase commitments of official development assistance 
for net disbursements to reach 0.70 per cent of its gross national product by 1975 or 
shortly thereafter, but in no case later than 1980.”
26  
 
The UN took on the 0.7% figure, but agreed that governments would exert “efforts” to 
reach it rather than agreeing to actually reach it. On November 19, 1970, the General 
Assembly adopted without vote the declaration of the Second Development Decade, 
calling for six percent GNI growth in developing countries and stating, “Each 
economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development 
assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum 
net amount of 0.7 per cent of its gross national product … by the middle of the 
Decade.”
27 What constituted sufficient effort was not defined. 
 
The General Assembly’s declaration of the Third Development Decade in 1980, again 
adopted without vote, called for yet higher average GNI growth in the developing 
countries—seven percent—and stated that a “rapid and substantial increase will be made 
in official development assistance by all developed countries, and where possible 
surpassing the agreed international target of 0.7 per cent of the gross national product of 
developed countries.”
28 The declaration of the Fourth Development Decade in 1990 
retained the seven percent growth goal and stated that “[d]onor countries should, in the 
1990s, implement such undertakings as they have made to reach or surpass” the 0.7% aid 
target.
29 The 0.7% figure was mentioned in UN declarations at the 1992 Conference on 
Environment and Development or “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro, the 1995 World 
Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, and the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg,
30 among other meetings. 
 
The most recent and high profile statement on the aid goal occurred at the UN’s 2002 
International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico. Its 
consensus declaration stated that “we urge developed countries that have not done so to 
make concrete efforts toward the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) as 
 
25 Personal communication with the authors, July 2005. Aziz later became Finance Minister and then 
Foreign Minister for Pakistan. See also “Minutes of the Meeting of the Peterson Task Force,” October 16, 
1969 for confirmation of this view by Pearson Commission member Douglas Dillon. 
26 Lester B. Pearson and others (1969), Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on 
International Development (New York: Praeger Publishers), pp. 148-149. 
27 UN General Assembly resolution 2626 (XXV), paragraph 43, November 19, 1970. 
28 UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/35/56, paragraphs 20 and 24, December 5, 1980. 
29 UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/45/199, paragraphs 17 and 40, December 21, 1990. 
30 UN documents A/CONF.151/26/REV.1; A/CONF.166/9; and A/CONF.199/20.  
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ODA [Official Development Assistance] to developing countries …”
31 This statement 
was seen to bear greater weight than other endorsements of the goal. Unlike previous 
meetings at which UN representatives had supported the goal, the Monterrey conference 
was personally attended by 50 heads of state or government, including those of Belgium, 
Canada, Finland, France, Norway, Spain, and the United States. 
 
Rich country commitments 
 
It is notable that none of the above international statements on the 0.7% goal amount to a 
promise attain it. In 1960 the General Assembly expressed the “hope” that capital flows 
would reach 1% of rich-country income. In 1964, UNCTAD I explicitly stated that this 
expression of hope was “not intended to represent … a suitable method for comparing … 
development assistance efforts between economically advanced countries.” In 1968, 
UNCTAD II stated that several developed countries were “not prepared to accept any 
precise ratio”. In 1970, the General Assembly pledged to “progressively increase” aid, 
and “exert its best efforts” to reach the goal—not to reach it per se. In 1980 the General 
Assembly promised a “rapid and substantial” increase in aid, but that would only exceed 
0.7% of donor GNI “where possible”. Most recently, the heads of state at Monterrey in 
2002 promised to “make concrete efforts toward” the goal, not to reach it. 
 
US “aversion to targetry” 
 
It is also clear that, while the Pearson Commission recommendation of 0.7% gained 
traction within the UN system and over time among some European governments, it 
never was able to convince the United States. President Richard Nixon initiated his own 
Task Force on International Development in 1969, chaired by Bank of America CEO 
Rudolph Peterson, to order to re-examine US foreign aid. One of the task force’s main 
questions to consider was “Should the U.S. support the official target of one percent of 
GNP devoted to foreign assistance?”
32 In the end, the task force recommended that aid be 
increased and a range of qualitative enhancements (such as greater use of multilateral 
channels), but took no position on the aid target.  
 
The administration followed Peterson’s lead and explicitly did not commit to the Pearson 
target for both substantive and political reasons.
33  C. Fred Bergsten, Special Assistant for 
International Economic Affairs at the National Security Council (in practice the lead 
advisor to Nixon on aid issues during the time of the Pearson Commission) claims:  
 
I was never convinced of the intellectual case for the 0.7% goal, plus we 
were quite confident that it would not be helpful to go to Congress and 
urge them to reach a 0.7% target....In fact I was careful to avoid 
committing to it because I thought it would be counterproductive in the 




31 UN document A/CONF.198/11. 
32 Minutes of First Meeting of the Peterson Task Force, September 24, 1969, p. 3. 
33 The administration prepared new foreign aid legislation based on the Peterson Task Force 
recommendations, but it was never voted on as Congressional attention moved to Southeast Asia following 
the US invasion of Cambodia. 
34 Personal communication with the authors, July 2005. Bergsten was at the NSC 1969-71 and at the US 
Treasury 1977-81.  
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Documents from that period suggest that the aid target was seriously debated inside the 
White House, but ultimately rejected. One National Security Council memorandum to 
Nixon summarizes the internal discussions: 
 
The [Peterson Task Force] Report does not endorse any aid targets. We 
believe that the Peterson approach, with its emphasis on need and LDC 
performance, is the only feasible one with the Congress. Nonetheless, our 
failure to endorse a target would raise serious political problems in the 
U.N. and may be used as a justification for less support by other donors. 
We should accordingly consider whether it is feasible for us to support the 
principle of a global aid target while at the same time indicating that we 
could not subscribe to any specific date for attaining it. Alternatively, we 
may wish to accept the implicit Peterson approach and emphasize our 
intent to seek higher levels but not subscribe to unattainable targets. This 
would be pleasing domestically to some in Congress and demonstrate a 




Secretary of State William Rogers and US Ambassador to the UN Charles Yost appear to 
be the main proponents, with both arguing in the months before the October 1970 UN 
Summit for the President to agree to the 1% target for total public and private flows. But 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger took the view that “[t]he U.S. will avoid any 
pledges to meet the international targets relating foreign assistance to GNP, but will seek 
to minimize damaging their usefulness to other donor countries.”
36  He sought to 
“balance our aversion to targetry with the foreign policy importance of avoiding a 
negative stance toward the Second UN Development Decade, and on aid levels in 
general.”
37  Most importantly, in the end President Nixon “rejected committing to setting 
unattainable targets.”
 38  Thus the Nixon administration did not formally commit itself to 
the 0.7% goal or any timetable—and no US administration since has changed this official 




No rich country, in any of these international fora prior to 2005, promised to actually give 
0.7% of its income in development aid. In these documents, they promised to walk uphill, 
but not to attain the summit. In 2005, for the first time ever, individual donors have 
unilaterally pledged to actually reach 0.7% of GDP by 2015.
39 At the time of this writing, 
Britain, France, Finland, Ireland, Belgium and Spain have made such a promise. 
Germany, Italy, and Portugal have made qualified commitments to the goal, conditional 
 
35 Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee to 
President Nixon, Washington, March 25, 1970. 
36 National Security Decision Memorandum 76, Washington, August 10, 1970 (signed by Henry 
Kissinger). 
37 Action Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, 
Washington, undated (attached to October 5, 1970 memo) 
38 May 28 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger, cited in editorial note in Foreign Relations, 1969-
1976, Volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972. US State 
Department, Office of the Historian (2002). 
39 Council of the European Union (2005), Press Release 8817/05 (Presse 112), 2660
th Council meeting, 
Brussels, 23 and 24 May 2005, p. 22. http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/85008.pdf, 
accessed July 1, 2005.  
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on domestic budget processes and without a firm timetable.
40 Five countries—praised by 
the Dutch Development Cooperation Minister as the “G 0.7”
41—have surpassed the goal: 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
 
The Europeans may have settled on this ‘accepted’ number largely because the press and 
nongovernmental actors have focused intensively on the 0.7% figure. In just the 12 
months leading up to June 2005, the 0.7% aid goal was mentioned 407 times in the 
world’s top 50 English-language newspapers.
42 The number of these mentions has grown 
over time: just 45 during 1980-1984, but 381 during 1990-1994, and 584 during 2000-
2004. Oxfam currently calls the 0.7% goal “the long-promised UN aid target”,
43 while 
InterAction exasperatedly refers to the goal as “a commitment made by the international 
community in 1969!”
44  The target has also inspired a number of specific “0.7 
campaigns,” for example, by ActionAid or the British Overseas NGOs for Development 
(BOND) network.
45 International organizations have joined in: James Wolfensohn, 
president of the World Bank from 1995 through early 2005, repeatedly called on rich 
country governments to honor their “commitment” to the 0.7% goal.
46 UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan has also called on developed countries to “commit themselves to 




Does the 0.7% goal make sense?  Did it ever? 
 
Despite its durability and seeming simplicity, the 0.7% aid target no longer makes sense 
as a benchmark for the level of resources rich countries should devote to helping poor 
ones. This is the case for three basic reasons:  the world has changed radically since the 
target was initially set; the method for arriving at the target is no longer considered 
credible; and the seemingly backward premise of determining the correct size of aid 
flows to poor countries based on the size of rich economies.  
 
1. Plugging today’s numbers into the model used to calculate the original goal 
 
The academic growth models of the 1950s used global conditions at the time—income 
levels, savings rates, and global capital flows—to make estimates of the total ‘financing 
gap’ which could be filled by aid to allow poor countries to reach a desirable rate of 
economic growth. Setting aside for a moment whether such an approach is grounded in 
 
40 Inter-Press Service (2005), “Development: EU to Increase Aid”, May 24. 
http://ipsnews.net/new_nota.asp?idnews=28801, accessed July 1, 2005. 
41 Eveline Herfkens (2002), “Speaking points”, United Nations Financing for Development Conference, 
Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002. http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/netherlandsE.htm, accessed July 1, 
2005. 
42 Search in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database, search terms “0.7 percent” and “development” and 
“aid” in full text, category “General News”, Source “Major Papers”, Time period “Previous year”, accessed 
July 1, 2005. 
43 Oxfam (2005), “Global Anti-Poverty Coalition challenges EU heads of state to do more for the world’s 
poorest”, press release, June 15. http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pr050615_eu_gcap.htm, accessed July 1, 2005. 
44 Emira Woods (2002), “Reflections on Monterrey”, Committee on Development Policy and Practice, 
InterAction. http://www.interaction.org/development/reflections.html, accessed July 1, 2005. 
45 www.actionaid.org and www.bond.org.uk; see also www.one.org.  
46 Inter alia James Wolfensohn (2004), “Statement at Africa Development Forum”, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
October 15, 2004, www.worldbank.org/news, accessed July 1, 2005. 
47 Kofi Annan, Statement to the UN General Assembly, New York, 21 March 2005; see also 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/0_7.htm for more references to the 0.7 target.  
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reality (see below), these conditions have certainly changed radically over the past half-
century.  
 
Figure 1 asks what would happen if we took essentially the same method used to estimate 
the original capital requirement in the 1960s and applied it to today’s numbers. We use a 
GDP growth target of six percent (the UN target of the Second Development Decade), 
only consider the 58 poorest countries (those classified as ‘low income’ by the World 
Bank),
48 and assume that each $3.50 of capital produces $1 of output (the 1960s 
researchers used either $3 or $4). In the early 1960s—here we take 1963 as the reference 
year—the collective GDP of those countries was $98.5 billion in current (1963) dollars.
49 
If each dollar of GDP requires $3.50 of capital, then growing at 6% requires $98.5 billion 
× 3.5 × 0.06 = $20.6 billion in investment. In 1963, gross domestic savings in those 
countries was 13.1% of GDP, or $12.9 billion. In this simplistic framework, that means 
the capital requirement from abroad was $7.8 billion (or $20.6 billion minus $12.9 
billion). Total GDP of the high-income OECD countries in 1963 was $1.23 trillion, so the 
capital ‘need’ of the low-income countries in 1960 was 0.64% of rich-country GDP. 
Repeating the exercise for all developing countries—including the middle-income 
countries—gives us a figure of about 1% for the early 1960s (see Table 1). This is exactly 
in line with the initial estimates that led to the current target. 
 
But over the next four decades, all of these conditions changed. First, gross domestic 
savings in the low-income countries rose to 20.3% by 2003; for developing countries as a 
whole it rose from about 18% to 28%. Second, the rich countries got much richer—their 
collective GDP rose by a factor of 3.7 from 1960 to 2003 in real terms.
50  Today, even the 
poorest countries have much more domestic capital now than they did in the 1960s and 
filling any gap between that domestic capital and any given capital ‘need’ would take a 
smaller fraction of rich countries’ vastly expanded wealth. For these reasons the 
‘financing gap’ for low-income countries declines to 0.03% of rich-countries’ collective 
income by 2003—much less than actual net capital flows (both public and private) that 
reached low-income countries in that year.
51  The capital ‘need’ for developing countries 
as a whole is, by this odd method, negative. This calculation is summarized in Table 1. In 
other words, if today we were to use the same techniques used to arrive at the 1% capital 
goal and consequent 0.7% aid goal, we would find that the goal was met years ago. We 
point this out not to claim that current capital flows are sufficient or insufficient, but 
rather to reveal the hollowness of the method and therefore of the capital target itself. In 




48 61 countries fit the World Bank ‘low income’ classification but there are insufficient data for the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Liberia, and Timor Leste. 
49 Figures are from the World Bank (2005), World Development Indicators 2005 CD-ROM (Washington, 
DC: World Bank). 
50 Table 1 shows nominal GDP in current dollars, not real GDP, thus high-income OECD GDP increases by 
a factor of 23.1 from 1963 to 2003. 
51 From World Bank (2005), Global Development Finance 2005 CD-ROM (Washington, DC: World 
Bank). See Appendix for results with different parameter assumptions.  
  13
Figure 1: Using the same technique used to calculate the original aid target, we arrive at 
a capital ‘need’ in low-income countries that is below current flows 
 





















































Capital need, using savings gap
Actual aggregate net resource flows
 
 























































I Capital need, using savings gap
Actual aggregate net resource flows
 
 
‘Low-income’ countries are the 61 defined by the World Bank as those with 2003 GNI per capita below US$765;  ‘Low- and middle-
income’ countries comprise the 154 with 2003 GNI per capita below US$9,385. Data on Gross Domestic Savings and GDP come 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2005 and Aggregate Net Resource Flows from Global Development Finance 
2005. Aggregate net resource flows are the sum of net resource flows on long-term debt (excluding IMF) plus net direct foreign 
investment, portfolio equity flows and official grants (excluding technical cooperation). Net flows (or net lending or net 
disbursements) are disbursements minus principal repayments.  
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Table 1: Plugging today’s numbers into the model used for the original aid goal 
 
  Low-income only  Low- and 
middle-income 
  1963 2003 1963 2003 
      
Actual data
52     
GDP, trillion current US$  0.098 1.103 0.407  7.125
High-income OECD GDP, trillion curr. US$  1.226 28.370 1.226  28.370
Gross Domestic Savings, % GDP  13.1% 20.3% 17.8%  28.0%
Aid as a fraction of capital flows
53 0.75 0.36 0.75 0.08
Total net capital flows, % rich-country GDP
54 0.1–0.2% 0.17% 0.83% 0.81%
   
First approach  
Assume capital output ratio  3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Assume growth  6% 6% 6% 6%
→ Capital need, % of rich country GDP
55 0.64% 0.03% 1.07% –1.76%
Assume constant fraction of capital is aid   
→ Aid need, % of rich-country GDP
56 0.48% 0.01% 0.80% –0.14%
   
Second approach  
Assume 0.7% of rich-country GDP in aid   
Implied total aid flow, billion current US$  8.6 198.6 8.6 198.6
→ Implied annual GDP growth
57 6.2% 10.9% 5.7% 8.8%
      
 
 
Table 1 carries this exercise one step further. UNCTAD and the Pearson commission 
went from the UN’s 1% capital goal to the 0.7% aid goal by assuming that official aid 
would continue to represent between two-thirds and three-quarters of all capital flows to 
developing countries, as it did in the early 1960s. This was not an unreasonable short-
term assumption around 1970. However, recent figures show that the share of private 
flows has changed substantially. Between 1998 and 2002, gross private capital flows 
represented an average of 4.8% of low-income country GDP and aid represented only 
2.7%.
58 Whereas in the 1960s only a third of capital flows to the poorest countries was 
private capital, today only a third is official. Thus, to use the same method of UNCTAD 
and the Pearson commission to create an aid goal for today, we would take the figure for 
the total capital requirement of low-income countries from Figure 1—0.03% of rich-
                                                 
52 Except where noted, all figures are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2005 CD-
ROM and Global Development Finance 2005 CD-ROM. 
53 2003 figures are “Aid (% of GNI)” divided by the sum of aid and “Gross private capital flows (% of 
GDP)”, from World Development Indicators 2005 CD-ROM. The 1963 figure is the UNCTAD estimate. 
54 Aggregate net resource flows. 1963 figure for low-income estimated from Figure 1. 1963 figure for low- 
and middle-income is from Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Second Session, New Delhi, 1 February–29 March 1968, Volume IV, Problems and policies of financing, 
Table 8, p. 26. 
55 Capital ‘need’ is calculated as F = Yl(kr – s)/Yh, where F is capital flow, Yl is aggregate GDP of the 
World Bank-defined low-income countries in current US$, k is the capital-output ratio, r is the growth rate 
expressed as a fraction, s is Gross Domestic Savings as a fraction of GDP, and Yh is aggregate GDP of the 
high-income OECD countries.  See Appendix for results with different parameter assumptions. 
56 Assumes, as in the original UNCTAD analysis, that the fraction of the capital need constituting the aid 
need equals the fraction of current capital flows to low-income countries that is aid. 
57 Uses the same nomenclature as the above note, r = ((F/Yl) + s)/k. Assumes capital-output ratio of 3.5. The 
qualitative conclusions here are robust to alternative assumptions of 3 or 4, standard in the 1960s analyses. 
58 World Development Indicators 2005 CD-ROM.  
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country GDP—and divide it by about three. The resulting ‘aid target’ is 0.01% of donor 
GDP for low-income countries, and negative aid flows to developing countries as a 
whole. Again, we do not in any way claim that this is the ‘right’ amount of aid, but only 
that it lays bare the folly of unreflective commitment to the 0.7% aid goal, which was 
calculated in nearly identical fashion four decades ago. 
 
The second approach of Table 1 turns the above calculation on its head. Assuming the 
model used to calculate the original aid goal was correct—and that poor-country growth 
depends on the degree to which aid fills the capital gap—how much would poor countries 
grow if 0.7% of rich-country GDP flowed as aid? This 0.7% meant about $8.6 billion in 
1963 dollars, but by 2003 it meant almost $200 billion. In 1963, the model suggests that 
$8.6 billion in aid along with then-low domestic savings would promote about 6% GDP 
growth in the developing world. This was plausible; over the 1960s, GDP growth was 
5.0% across all developing countries and 4.2% in low-income countries.
59
 
But taking today’s higher savings in poor countries, and again assuming that it takes 
$3.50 of capital to raise output by $1, the assumptions mean that sending about $200 
billion per year in aid to low-income countries would cause their aggregate GDP to grow 
at 11% per year. To put this in perspective, not one of the 154 low- or middle-income 
countries in World Bank data had average GDP growth this high between 1980 and 2003. 
(China was closest at 9.52%; the next two highest were Botswana at 7.6% and Bhutan at 
6.9%.) The model likewise suggests that sending the same $200 billion to all developing 
countries—including middle-income—would provoke 8.8% GDP growth. The typical 
developing country GDP grew at 2.7% during this period. We stress that we do not 
suggest this growth would actually occur. We only suggest that there is little modern 
relevance to a model whose assumptions imply that aid flows alone could spark China-
like growth rates or better across the entire developing world. 
 
2. Problems with the Financing Gap Model Itself 
 
The fundamental problem is that the model assumed above, while suitable to Harrod and 
Domar’s original purposes, is nowhere near to an effective portrait of the process of long-
term economic development. The concept of the ‘financing gap’ is fraught with problems 
and has not been credible among development economists for decades. Some version of  
the Harrod-Domar or the associated “two-gap” (savings gap and foreign exchange gap) 
model is nonetheless still commonly used for estimating how much aid will be needed to 
reach certain growth targets in aid agencies as a back-of-the-envelope technique. These 
estimates start from the difference between current growth and the desired rate, 
suggesting a “growth gap.”  The approach then uses the incremental capital output ratio 
(ICOR) to calculate what level of investment is required to reach the growth levels (in 
our example above we use an ICOR of 3.5), then subtracts domestic savings to get the 
external financing gap—or the amount of required aid. The problem is that, in practice, 
the financing gap model does not work. Economist Bill Easterly demonstrates weak 
relationships in developing countries all along the aid-to-investment-to-growth chain.
60 
Greater aid does not necessarily lead to higher investment (Easterly in fact finds that the 
relationship may, on average, even be negative). He also shows that the link from 
 
59 Ibid. 
60 William Easterly (1999), “The Ghost of Financing Gap: Testing the Growth Model Used in the 
International Financial Institutions,” Journal of Development Economics, 60 (2): 423-438.  
  16
                                                
investment to growth is more complicated than the financing gap model assumes. Indeed, 
if the financing gap approach had worked as expected over the period 1960-1994, 
Easterly calculates that Zambia’s per capita income would have been $20,000, or 33 
times the actual figure of about $600.
61  Despite the fact that the financing gap approach 
“fails all theoretical checks and empirical tests,”
62 it continues to influence aid allocation 
today and the rationale for aid targets. 
 
3. Calculating the ‘right’ level of aid from donor side rather than recipient side 
 
Lastly, even if the financing gap model is flawed and the assumptions are out of date, at 
least that approach starts by looking at recipient countries. The 0.7% target takes as a 
given that the right barometer is a static portion of rich country economies. It does not 
make sense to calculate the requirements of one set of countries based on an (almost 
wholly) unrelated indicator in a different set of countries. More specifically, why set the 
‘right’ level of aid for poor countries based on the size of rich economies?  If a particular 
country is thought deserving of a particular amount of aid—based on need, a financing 
gap estimate, or whatever measure—that number likely has no relationship to a different 
economy, which may be on the other side of the globe and have few direct linkages.  
 
If we take a particular country, say Ghana, and try to determine what level of aid might 
be appropriate and desirable, the starting point would logically be to start asking about 
conditions in Ghana. Important questions would include: What are Ghana’s development 
needs?  Where are there shortages of capital?  What interventions might reasonably be 
externally financed? What would be the effects of those interventions on Ghanaian 
institutions, policies, and technology?  It would not advance the analysis to ask, ‘How big 
is the French economy?’ Ability to pay for a certain policy is only a very small part of 
rich countries’ criteria for domestic spending of public funds; the effects of the policy are 
of paramount importance. This should be equally true in debates on international 
spending. 
 
More recent attempts to calculate the worldwide aggregate aid ‘need’ have not advanced 
much beyond the backward techniques used to calculate the 0.7% goal in the 1960s. 
Widely cited estimates of a $50 billion need in additional aid to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals, for example, are largely based on two studies—one by a group 
known as the Zedillo Commission and another by Shanta Devarajan and co-authors at the 
World Bank.
63 The Zedillo Commission study based its estimate of capital needed to 
spark sufficient growth to halve poverty over 25 years—the first Millennium 
Development Goal—primarily on an UNCTAD study using a mechanistic financing gap 
model.
64 That UNCTAD study assumes that if capital flows were to somehow be 
sufficient to raise investment to 22% of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa, real GDP growth in 
 
61 William Easterly (2001). The Elusive Quest for Growth, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, p. 43. 
62 Easterly (1999) op. cit., p. 437. 
63 “Report of the High-Level Panel on Financing for Development”, commissioned by UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan and prepared by a panel of 11 financial experts under the leadership of former 
Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo, presented to Annan on June 28, 2001. www.un.org/reports/financing, 
accessed July 7, 2005; Shantayanan Devarajan, Margaret J. Miller, and Eric V. Swanson (2002), ”Goals for 
Development: History, Prospects, and Costs,” Policy Research Working Paper 2819, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
64 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2000), Capital Flows and Growth in Africa 
(New York: United Nations). The “Report of the High-Level Panel” op. cit. cites this UNCTAD study on p. 
30.  
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that region would necessarily be 6% per year. Unfortunately for simplistic models of this 
kind, the assumptions that in Africa (a) all aid becomes investment and (b) all investment 
becomes growth have no empirical support. The evidence is very strong that Africa’s 
growth performance has been weak not from a lack of capital per se, but from low 
productivity of that capital.
65 This model estimates roughly a $10 billion capital ‘need’ 
for Africa, which the Zedillo report simply doubles to account for other developing 
regions. For the rest of the development goals the report throws up its hands: “It is clear 
that our present knowledge does not suffice to put a convincing price tag, even a rough 
one, on the cost of meeting the human development goals.”
66 It nevertheless settles on 
$30 billion for the rest of the goals, for a total of $50 billion, and uses this final figure 
throughout its text. 
 
The study by Devarajan and others uses two techniques to arrive at its aid target. The first 
is a very simple “financing gap” model quite similar to that used in the UNCTAD study. 
The second attempts to calculate the cost of the goals for education and health 
attainments by assuming that expenditure levels for currently-served populations, if 
scaled up to the amounts that would be needed if vastly expanded populations were being 
served, would actually result in those target populations being universally served. The 
authors note that such an analysis is beset by “weak, and sometimes contradictory 
evidence on the relationship between public expenditures [and outcomes]; difficulty in 
disentangling the complementary roles of supply and demand [for services]; and poor 
data quality.” They conclude by emphasizing “that these estimates are extremely crude, 
and based on a host of heroic assumptions, many of which may not be borne out as 
history unfolds. … [W]e cannot stress enough the fact that financial assistance is but one 
of the factors required to reach these goals.”
67 Despite reliance by both the Zedillo 
estimates and the Devarajan et al. estimates on the flawed financing gap model—and oft-
forgotten caveats by Devarajan et al. that their complementary estimates are extremely 
crude, may be way off, and do not suggest that such expenditures per se would actually 
cause the goals to be met—their independent $50 billion estimates have been widely 
cited as the new aid ‘need’.
68  
 
But these contemporary estimates do not serve as anything like modern justifications of 
the 0.7% aid goal, for two reasons. First, they are calculated using flawed techniques 
remarkably similar to those used in the early 1960s. Second, even if they were correct, 
they would imply a total aid need—an additional $50 billion to reach a world total of 
about $110 billion per year—representing just 0.35% of the GDP of the high-income 
OECD countries. That is, these new estimates suggest that the 0.7% goal overestimates 
aid ‘need’ by one hundred percent.  
 
 
65 Shantayanan Devarajan, William R. Easterly, and Howard Pack (2003), “Low investment is not the 
constraint on African development”, Economic Development and Cultural Change 51 (3): 547-571. 
66 “Report of the High-Level Panel” op. cit. p. 31. 
67 Devarajan et al. (2002), pp. 22-23 and 30. 
68 For more analysis of the MDG costing studies and the problems associated with pricetags on 
development outcomes see Michael Clemens, Charles Kenny, and Todd Moss (2004), “The Trouble with 
the MDGs: Confronting expectations of aid and development success,” Working Paper 40, Center for 
Global Development, Washington DC, May.  
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One recent estimate that does try to start from the recipient ‘need’ and add up the costs is 
the Millennium Project.
69  Even if one were to accept their methodology and their long 
list of recommended interventions (many of which are problematic), they nonetheless 
only arrive at 0.54% of rich country GNI as the total aid requirement. That is, even the 
most ambitious estimates suggest that 0.7% is vastly overstated.  
 
Skepticism over the 0.7% aid target is not to say that knowing the aid budget relative to a 
donor’s economy is entirely useless. ODA/GNI is a fair indicator of a country’s aid 
budget relative to other spending priorities and arguably could be considered a relative 
measure of a country’s ‘generosity’ toward international development. But ODA/GNI 
does not tell us anything about the ‘right’ absolute size of flows to a particular set of 
countries. 
 
There is no ‘right’ fixed target  
 
There’s the rub. The 0.7% target was always intended as a tool to lobby rich governments 
to raise their aid budgets—it was never intended to be an actual target for the appropriate 
level of ODA. It is an arbitrary figure based on a series of outdated assumptions going 
into a dubious model and measured against the wrong metric. Our reading of the original 
texts reveals that in no UN forum did any government ever commit to reach the target—
though many pledged to move toward it.  Successive US administrations in fact explicitly 
avoided any such commitment. 
 
Is there any harm in promoting nonsensical goals?  For an international aid goal to be 
useful as an actual practical target, it must be matched to the needs and conditions of 
recipients and also to the political process and budget priorities of the donors. Our 
interpretation is that 0.7% fails both of these tests.  Assessing financing needs on the 
recipient side is extremely difficult; the Zedillo Commission cautions that even a rough 
price tag is probably impossible. In fact, 0.7% simply tells us nothing about the real 
financial requirements of poor countries. Stretching 0.7% to become a functional target 
for aid budgets that applies across all donors—as it appears that the UN, activists, and 
even some governments have come to believe—is to give the target a life and purpose for 
which was never intended. That no longer makes any sense, if it ever did.   
 
Perhaps more importantly, a goal divorced from political realities could even be 
counterproductive as a lobbying tool.  Many NGOs and aid proponents clearly find that 
the 0.7% target is a useful way to urge their own governments to boost their spending on 
development assistance. In that political role, the target has probably been a success, 
especially in Europe.  However, the 0.7% target was, almost from its inception, aimed 
squarely at the United States. The Nixon administration, even as it considered a major 
overhaul of its foreign aid program, determined that agreeing to the target would prove 
poisonous with the real appropriators, the US Congress. This is arguably even truer today 
than 35 years ago. A static global goal based on rich country income may play well in 
Europe and provide political motivation to increase their aid budgets, but it has the 
opposite effect in the US where successive administrations have had, as Kissinger put it, 
an ‘aversion to targetry.’ The 0.7% target is thus not only conceptually wrong and 
 
69 Millennium Project (2005), Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals, Report to the UN Secretary General.  
  19
impractical, but its continued use to shame the US into more than quintupling its aid 





APPENDIX: Consequences of different parameter assumptions 
 
Here we test the sensitivity of the results in Table 1 to different assumptions of capital 
output ratio and desired recipient-country growth. 
 
In his work in the 1960s, Chenery found a median capital-output ratio of 3.52 (Hollis B. 
Chenery and Alan M. Strout [1966], “Foreign Assistance and Economic Development”, 
American Economic Review 56 [4]: 679-733, p.684), though it varied roughly in the 
range of 3 to 4 across countries in his sample.  Other studies of the period (e.g. P. N. 
Rosenstein-Rodan [1961], “International aid for undeveloped countries” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 43 [2]: 107-138) used a capital-output ratio of 3.  Some modern 
research estimates a capital-output ratio in the 1990s in many developing countries of 
closer to 2; we include this assumption as well. 
 
Below we include targeted GDP growth of 5%, the explicit target in the UN Declaration 
of the First Development Decade in 1960 (General Assembly resolution 1710 [XVI], 
December 19, 1961). 
 
  Low-income only  Low- and 
middle-income 
  1963 2003 1963 2003 
      
Assume capital output ratio  222  2
Assume growth  6% 6% 6% 6%
→ Capital need, % of rich country GDP  –0.08% –0.32% –1.92% –4.02%
→ Aid need, % of rich-country GDP  –0.06% –0.12% –1.44% –0.32%
   
Assume capital output ratio  333  3
Assume growth  6% 6% 6% 6%
→ Capital need, % of rich country GDP  0.40% –0.09% 0.07% –2.51%
→ Aid need, % of rich-country GDP  0.30% –0.03% 0.05% –0.20%
   
Assume capital output ratio  444  4
Assume growth  6% 6% 6% 6%
→ Capital need, % of rich country GDP  0.88% 0.14% 2.06% –1.00%
→ Aid need, % of rich-country GDP  0.66% 0.05% 1.55% –0.08%
   
Assume capital output ratio  3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Assume growth  5% 5% 5% 5%
→ Capital need, % of rich country GDP  0.36% –0.11% –0.10% –2.64%
→ Aid need, % of rich-country GDP  0.27% –0.04% –0.07% –0.21%
      
 
 